My Divergence from Objectivism and Objectivists

I consider myself an Objectivist*, but there are some places where I disagree or, at least, don’t yet agree with Objectivism or with what many/most Objectivists think. I thought it might be fun to make a list of these issues, and maybe I’ll keep this up to date as my ideas grow and might eventually put links in to posts where I explain my views in more detail. Not all of these ideas are dealt with directly by Rand’s work, but for those that aren’t I believe my view differs from that of a significant portion of Objectivists, and that those Objectivists view the issue as an important philosophical one.

  • I don’t think metaphysics on its own can tell us very much about cosmology or ontology, even to a greater extent than most Objectivists. For example, I don’t think we can say from philosophy alone whether the universe has finite spatial extent, whether the universe contains empty space or is completely filled with matter, whether instantaneous action at a distance is possible, or whether conscious awareness can play a special role in a fundamental physical theory. I do think all of these questions can be answered, and that many of them have been partially or totally answered by scientific study, but the answers cannot come from philosophy.
  • I do not think all generalizations are fundamentally statements of causality. An important class of generalizations are, perhaps the most important class, but statements like “tables are furniture” and, even, “lightning is electrical discharge” are not statements of cause and effect (though they may have to be proven by identification of certain cause-effect relationships).
  • I do not see that definitions are as important in the concept formation process as Rand did. I’m not convinced that they’re not as important as she thought, I just don’t see it (yet).
  • I think Objectivists are libertarians.
  • I disagree with the vast majority of the Objectivist sexual ethic. I think things like pornography (consumption and creation), casual sex, prostitution (selling and buying), non-monogamy both in terms of sexual partners and probably even in terms of life partners, and all sorts of kinks, fetishes, and orientations, even those that I might find extremely painful or disgusting, can all be moral in a wide variety of non-exceptional circumstances. This topic deserves its own blog post, and I just may write it some day.
  • I think the gender roles that Rand’s theories of masculinity and femininity try to put people into (both in and out of bed) are rubbish. I think a women can rationally want to be president, that a man can be a primary caregiver, that transvestitism, transsexualism, and all sorts of gender-bending can be completely moral. In fact, I think most of the assumptions in our society about how a person’s genitals relate to their behaviour and preferences are largely fucked up and the fact that we need a concept for, for example, men who wear dresses is largely an indictment of our culture, not an indication about the nature of the behaviour itself. Also, while I do think that in cases of undetermined gender the singular masculine pronouns (e.g. “he”) are more grammatically appropriate than the third-person plural (e.g “they”), I think the word for person is “person” and not “man” and the word for people is “people” and not “men”.
  • I think that the government must be the ultimate arbiter of retaliatory force, but not necessarily the only wielder of said force. For example, I think that a private individual who follows the proper procedures (e.g. obtaining warrants from a judge, following the proper limits on search and seizure, using only due force, announcing his presence, etc.) could be able to investigate crimes and even perform arrests. How such a system might work or whether the system would be preferable to the current one is not my point, my point is just that as long as there is a single entity ultimately responsible for determining the justice of the use of physical force the actual force-wielders need not be government agents. In particular this applies to military action: if there is a country where rights violations are occurring on a massive scale but there is no threat to your country or its citizens, I think there should be a path you can take to get together private volunteer forces, get your goals approved, and use force to stop the rights violations in the foreign country.
  • I think that the “total war” view on warfare is completely mistaken. While I do think there are limits to the steps the military should take in preventing civilian casualties when attacking military targets, the idea that it’s moral to purposely target civilian centers is abhorrent. I think military actions like Sherman’s march to the sea are viciously unjust, and ideas like “the citizens are responsible for the actions of the government” and “the government couldn’t do what it’s doing without the support of its people” are extremely collectivist and completely ignorant of just how hard it is to change a government, especially a totalitarian one. I definitely don’t think things like building a mosque near ground zero or cheering in the streets after a terrorist attack are as such deserving of a forceful response.
  • I don’t think an aesthetic view is fundamental in philosophy, and I don’t agree with Rand’s aesthetics. I don’t disagree with it either, I just don’t really have any views on the issue either way. I don’t get much out of painting, sculpture, architecture, or any other visual arts, and I’ve never understood how a philosophical understanding could deepen my appreciation of the arts I do care about (literature, television, film, theatre, and music).
  • I do not think patents and copyrights, when awarded in a proper intellectual property framework (which I think we don’t have today), should have any limits on their duration.
  • I think any clear term in a properly signed contract should be enforceable. This includes contracts in which one person makes himself a slave, a person promises to allow another to punch him, etc. How these terms should be enforced is a difficult matter: in the absence of an enforcement clause, I can see a fine or jail until the uncooperative participant allows the contract to be followed. I don’t think it’s reasonable for the courts to have to bear the burden of actually enforcing each term (e.g. holding a person still so the other can punch him), but I don’t in principle have an objection to a court issuing permission to the winner of a breach-of-contract case to use appropriate force himself to satisfy the terms of the contract. I think that if such a system were to be put in place, most contracts would (properly, IMO) include a clause specifying monetary damages in case of breach.

*: With some worries about the term, see this post.

Why Do We Need Definitions?

The topic of definitions has always been an aspect of epistemology that eludes me a bit. I kind of see the value when trying to communicate a concept to others: If someone tells me that a memristor is a resistor whose resistance depends on the history of the current through the device, then I can get a general sense of what the referents of the concept are like, even without knowing anything about any particular one. But Rand thought that definitions are essential for cognition, not just communication, and that the formation of a concept isn’t really complete until you have a definition. I would say though that for the vast majority of the concepts I use, I don’t really have a good concise definition and would have to spend some significant time coming up with one. So, what am I missing? Why are definitions so important? What kinds of real-life situations are improved by having a proper definition for your concepts?

A Preliminary Definition of Libertarian

Friday’s post has stirred up a small bit of controversy in the comments, on Twitter, and on at least one other blog. Right now I’m in an unusual situation for me: I’m pretty confident in my conclusion, but don’t really care at all that other Objectivists disagree with it. All in all, this issue isn’t that important and to me it’s a definite case where agreeing to disagree and moving on to other things is the right way to handle the situation. That being said, one of the comments on my post got me thinking about how I would define libertarian, so I thought I’d give that a shot here. I’m not terribly good at coming up with definitions, and to be honest I haven’t really seen first-hand (because I haven’t really thought about the issue, not because I think there is no need) the strong cognitive need for them in all cases, but this is what I’ve come up with:

A libertarian is a person who believes that the initiation of force has no proper role in human society.*

The measurements omitted from my concept of libertarian include, among others, beliefs about:

  • Who (if anyone) should be responsible for enacting retaliatory force?
  • What lead the individual to accept his political beliefs?
  • What path should we take in getting from our society to a libertarian one?
  • Should the abortion of a fetus be considered initiating force against it, or should the prohibition of abortion be considered initiation of force against mothers?
  • Should sexual activity between an adult and a young minor be considered initiating force against the minor, or should the prohibition of such activity be considered initiation of force against the would-be sexual partners?

That being said, there are many beliefs which aren’t omitted from my view, including:

  • Is an employer who requires working 16 hour days as a condition of employment initiating force against his employers employees [Edit 5/10 14:37]? No, not according to libertarianism.
  • Should there be a welfare system funded by coercion? No, not according to libertarianism.
  • Should businesses be bailed out with money obtained by coercion? No, not according to libertarianism.
  • Should any sexual activity between fully informed, mentally healthy, consenting adults be considered initiation of force? No, not according to libertarianism.
  • Should the fully informed, consensual consumption of any substance obtained through consensual trade or other non-forceful means be considered initiation of force? No, not according to libertarianism.

I’m fully open to the idea that my definition here is lacking or erroneous. I’m completely certain that the concept I have in mind is a valid one, and I’m pretty sure that the concept I have in mind is indeed “libertarian”, but I’d love to hear if anyone has a word that better fits my concept here.

 

*: For those who aren’t familiar with Ayn Rand’s theory of definitions, a definition does not need to state all of the common characteristics of the unit of the concept, nor can a concept be simply replaced with its definition. So don’t take this to be a mathematical or computational type of definition.

Objectivists are Libertarians

Consider Joseph Stalin, Christopher Hitchens, and Ayn Rand. The three of them are wildly different on so many levels from each other, from their personalities to their jobs to their philosophies and everything in between. Despite this, there is at least one axis along which they share a commonality that distinguishes them from many other people1: religious belief. All three would agree that there is no god and that organized religion is a bad thing. Did they all come to those views for the same reason? No. Would their common belief be enough reason for them to work together for some delimited common cause? Not necessarily. But there is something to be gained in recognizing this particular commonality and, in the right circumstances, treating all three as units of the same group. We know, for a trivial example, that none of these three can be expected to be spending their Sundays in a church. The commonalities these three share are begging for conceptualization, and most Objectivists would readily apply the English word to all three: atheist.

Consider John Stossel, Radley Balko, and Ayn Rand. The three of them are wildly different on so many levels from each other, from their personalities to their jobs to their philosophies and everything in between. Despite this, there is at least one axis along which they share a commonality that distinguishes them from many other people: political belief. All three would agree that the vast majority of activities between consenting adults should be legal and that the current US government acts far out of the bounds of the proper scope of a government. Did they all come to those views for the same reason? No. Would their common belief be enough reason for them to work together for some delimited common cause? Not necessarily. But there is something to be gained in recognizing this particular commonality and, in the right circumstances, treating all three as units of the same group. For example, I would definitely prefer to have any of the them be a legislator over almost anyone that doesn’t share this commonality. The commonalities these three share are begging for conceptualization, but most Objectivists wouldn’t apply the English word to the third: libertarian.

The question of whether Objectivists qua Objectivists are libertarians boils down to two other questions: Is there a valid concept that unities Objectivists and non-Objectivists with similar general political views, regardless of the origin of those views? And if so is that concept the same one referred to by the word ‘libertarian’? I think the answer to both questions is a definite yes. Objectivists and people like Neal Boortz, Milton Friedman, or my brother absolutely have a lot of important political views in common, especially when contrasted with the political views of the average person. That political similarity is fundamental enough to allow for valid generalizations encompassing those who share it to be formed, such as “people who share this set of political views are regularly unimpressed with the offerings of the major political parties”. Moreover, I contend that the group of people who share the political similarity is exactly the group meant when people use the word “libertarian”. This is definitely the case for all the non-Objectivist political blogs, newspaper articles, Wikipedia entries, etc. I read online and all of the real-life conversations I have with non-Objectivists. So why do Objectivists typically have such a big problem with describing themselves as libertarian?

I want to make it clear that I’m not claiming Objectivists should join libertarian organizations or that Objectivists and non-Objectivist libertarians should work together on political activism. I simply don’t know enough about activism or any particular libertarian organization to say either way. Nor do I think that an Objectivist and a non-Objectivist libertarian would agree on every political issue, or that a non-Objectivist libertarian can be expected to be as consistent in his politics or philosophy as an Objectivist. But those concerns do not invalidate the concept “libertarian”, nor do they exclude Objectivists from classification under it.

So, Objectivists who don’t consider yourselves libertarians: What gives?

1: This, by the way, is why “atheist” is a real concept and “agremlinist” or “aunicornist” are not: In a world where (effectively) everybody holds a certain view, there is no cognitive utility in grouping those with that view together.

Questions about Aesthetics and Art

  • What is art? I’m particularly interested in what the essential distinguishing characteristics are, but the non-essentials are also important. I’d particularly like to find an answer to this that highlights the cognitive value in having and applying the concept.
  • Which of the following, if any, are art: music, theatre, architecture, interior design, decorative illustration, dance, cooking, stop-motion videos.
  • What is the role of art in man’s life? Is it essential, or can a good life be lived without it? If it is necessary, what about man’s consciousness necessitates it and what would happen without it?
  • In my experience, responses to art are largely automatic. What, if anything, is gained from understanding the genesis of those responses? Can anything be determined about a man’s premises by knowing what types of art he values?
  • Can art alter subconscious premises?
  • Should knowing the methods or interpretations of the artist affect our response to his artwork?
  • Are any of these questions part of philosophy proper, or are they more properly thought of as philosophy of art?

Ayn Rand, Objectivism, and the Objectivist Movement

In philosophy, as in every intellectual field, I strive (largely successfully, I think) to be a completely independent thinker. I look at the evidence, study the issues, and come to my conclusions on my own. That doesn’t mean I’m never influenced by others, far from it: the ideas and arguments of other people often play a huge role in my ultimate conclusion. But I only accept their stances if I can make their arguments fit with what I see, and in the end my conclusions are, in fact, mine. So, while my philosophy is immensely influenced by the work of others, it is a unique system of thought both in its content (I doubt anyone else believes the same totality of philosophical knowledge that I do, and I have reason to believe that some nuances of my philosophical thought are wholly my own) and in the specifics of the approach that led me to it.

And yet. As is obvious to most everyone who knows me online, there is one thinker whose influence on my philosophical thought is of a qualitatively different type than all others. Ayn Rand’s work inspired my systematic study of philosophy, her views and arguments are those I’ve studied and worked to understand far and above any other thinker, and, particularly as the issues get more fundamental, I agree with the the vast majority of her philosophy (excluding her aesthetics, which I have not studied in depth). Moreover, even though there are places we disagree (such as limits on the lifetime of intellectual property), places that she covered where I have no opinion (such as in most important areas of aesthetics), and places that I’ve covered where she has no opinion that I know of (such as the role of statistical methods in scientific discovery), I believe that the essence of the way I live my life is the same as that of someone who lived his life in accordance with the principles of her published philosophy (I don’t know enough about her personal life to say whether or not she was such a person). Despite the importance of her work to my life and our philosophical similarities, however, her philosophy is not, and never will be, mine. Even if I were to spend my life studying her work, understanding it all, and agreeing with all of her philosophical positions, my philosophy would still be mine by virtue of the independent way in which I came to accept it.

Why does this matter? Well, I call myself an Objectivist. But Objectivism is the philosophy of Ayn Rand (I will leave aside for now whether it is the philosophy given by her written works, her lectures, and the approved works and lectures of others or whether it is the philosophy she actually lived by, or whether there is a difference). If an Objectivist is someone whose accepted and lived-by philosophy is Objectivism, then I am not an Objectivist (nor, I would claim, is/was anyone except Rand herself, since the tenants of Objectivism preclude someone accepting her word without independent thought). Even if the requirements are looser than that, however, I still have misgivings about the term. It’s hard to say exactly why, but I have a few thoughts.

Calling yourself an Objectivist seems to shift the focus from which principles you accept to the fact that those principles happen to match a particular historical system (whereas calling yourself a laisseiz-faire capitalist, for example, merely describes a particular position that has no relevant historical qualities to it). Because of this, if you call yourself an Objectivist, it seems important to check your views against Rand’s work if given reason to think they don’t match, even if you’re sure your views are right and don’t think seeing Rand’s view will help you understand the actual philosophical issue better for yourself. It also leads to a tendency for some to substitute discussions about what Rand actually meant on a particular issue for discussions about what the participants mean on that issue (not to say that the former type of discussion is always inappropriate, but often the latter type is more relevant).

I also worry that, since Objectivism is now a fixed body of knowledge, there might be tendencies to study of that body of knowledge for study of philosophy as such (with study of other philosophers often being thought of as solely “history of philosophy”) and to subconsciously resist (not to completely block, but to decrease the likelihood of) thinking about ideas that are outside of or contradict Objectivism. Some people, for example, will respond to reasonable challenges to their views that they don’t want to address not with “you may be right, but I don’t have time/inclination to figure this out right now and my current view is serving me well” but with “you may be right, but I agree with Rand on so many issues and she’s a brilliant integrator, so I give her views benefit of the doubt until I have addressed them”. I’ve also seen many people go through many contortions to cast truly new philosophical questions (whether fundamental principles or just applications) in such a way as to suggest that Rand already answered the question or that there is another question that Rand answered that is only superficially different. One possible example of this latter problem is those who present the “total war” approach to warfare as Rand’s, though perhaps she did address it somewhere and I’ve simply been unable to find it. One definite example (which I had seen long before The Logical Leap) is those who try to stretch Rand’s words in such a way as to claim that she already had an (implicit, some argue) theory on induction, even when she clearly stated that she did not. Also, when people DO seriously consider new ideas, they often focus on the question “is this consistent with Objectivism?” rather than “is this consistent with reality and my views?”

Calling oneself an Objectivist may be an injustice both to yourself and to Rand. To yourself, because you are assigning your core set of ideas that you have worked hard to independently arrive at and validate to Rand. To Rand, because unless you are very conscientious in presenting your views you might be implicitly attributing views that Rand did not hold to her simply by calling yourself an Objectivist while presenting them. I’m not sure, however, how significant this issue really is.

So why don’t I just stop calling myself an Objectivist? This is an issue of concept formation. There is a group of people that includes me, a significant subset of my friends and acquaintances, my girlfriend, and some of the public figures I care about that doesn’t include my family, some of my closest friends, or some of my most admired public figures. Conceptualizing this group is important because membership in the group implies similar values, ways of life, and approaches to issues in a way that reasonably affects how members of the group interact with each other. For example, despite all that I have in common with my brother, I have no reason to expect that he’d be interested in an Atlas Shrugged reading group or attending the Atlanta Objectivist Society’s mini-con, but, even though I’ve only just started talking to him and in some ways have far less in common with him, I can reasonably expect that Santiago Valenzuela might be interested. As another example, while I can reasonably expect to be able to discuss the role of measurement-omission in concept formation with any random member of the group without having to explain what I mean by basic terms or set up my cognitive framework, I would probably have to spend a lot of time working just to make sure my good friend Kathy (with whom I’ve often discussed ideas) understand what I’m saying, let alone has cause to believe it (A good illustration of this is the time I listened to the first few lectures of Dr. Peikoff’s Induction in Physics and Philosophy series while in the car with my brother. Seth was legitimately listening and trying to chew what Dr. Peikoff was saying, and about an hour and a half in he paused the CD and asked something along the lines of: why does Dr. Peikoff keep talking about “generalizations”, aren’t those inherently over-sweeping statements (often about people) that don’t apply to all the particulars? I was able to explain what was meant, but that question had never even occurred to me.) So I think there is a good cognitive case for giving that group an associated concept, and the best concept I have for now is “Objectivist”. I’d definitely like to figure out a better term (if not a different concept), however, for the reasons stated above.

As a first step toward either figuring out the new term/concept or deciding that “Objectivist” actually fits, I’d like to discuss some of the essential distinguishing characteristics that I think the group has. First, the members of the group live idea- and value-oriented lives. This actually rules out some so-called Objectivists who, to use John Allison’s phrasing, accept Rand’s view only “on the top of their heads” and don’t have them fully integrated with their lives and thinking, but it’s far too broad on its own. Second, these are people whose philosophies were shaped, solidified, and/or confirmed by study of Rand’s work. This rules out people who have come to many of the same conclusions as Rand independently of her (which is important because such a person would probably think in different terms and be less interested in studying/discussing Rand’s work than actual members of the group), but by itself might be said to cover even people such as Alan Greenspan (who, after all, was definitely shaped by Rand’s work, even if he rejects it) who definitely do not belong in the group. Third, these are people who agree with the essential principles of Rand’s philosophy. This is a challenging characteristic since it raises the obvious question: essential, for what purpose? If someone agrees that A is A but disagrees that selfishness is moral, he definitely doesn’t belong to the group, but I differ from Rand on her characterization of percepts as being somehow composed of sensations, yet I think I do belong. I’m not sure how to determine where the line of “essential” is in this case, so for now I’ll have to be content with a vague “I’ll know it when I see it” standard of judging this factor.

Though I’m far from certain, I think these three characteristics, while hardly exhaustively descriptive of the group, are enough to distinguish its members from non-members in a way that best explains most of the characteristics that group members have in common with each other but differ from non-members. In other words, I think a properly condensed statement of these characteristics might serve as a good definition of the concept I am searching for. So now that I have a (sloppy, in current form) definition, I need a word. I’m loathe to create an entire new word without being sure nothing existing covers this, but I’ve had a hard time figuring out what existing word my fit. I’m slightly leaning toward “Randian”, but that might actually increase the emphasis on Rand herself, and it also has a negative connotation as it’s currently used. I don’t really have any ideas besides this one, and it’s not particularly good, so for now I’ll use “Objectivist”, take care to recognize all the potential problems with that term, and keep searching for a better one.

Thinking about this issue has made me rethink what the central goals of an Objectivist social movement should be. Previously, I had thought that spreading understanding and acceptance of Objectivism throughout the culture was the fundamental goal. But now that seems to focused on the particular historical ideology to be a central goal. Honestly, while I certainly wouldn’t mind a world where most people were Objectivists, I don’t view such a world as necessary for the kind of society I want to live in and the kind of values I want to exist, and I have doubts about whether most the population should even be reasonably expected to care about philosophy in the explicit, in-depth way that being an Objectivist requires. That being said, there are certain central goals that I think an Objectivist movement (or some aspect thereof) should reasonably address. The primary social one is implementation of laisseiz-faire capitalism, for reasons I don’t think I have to explain here. Another value, though less important, is more people creating intellectual work based on a philosophical framework influenced by Objectivism in the way described above. Creating more social opportunities for Objectivists to interact would also be a huge benefit. Finally, having a more significant portion of the population approach their work rationally (though not necessarily in accordance with Objectivism) would be a great benefit, especially in intellectual fields (e.g. I don’t care if my physics teacher is an Objectivist, but I do want him to stop telling me that physicist can only describe appearances, not reality). Now, it may turn out that the best way to achieve these goals is to spread Objectivism as such, but even if so I think that should properly be viewed as the means, not the end, of a movement of Objectivists. So from now on, to the extent that I support or participate in any organized Objectivist endeavours, I will be careful to ensure that the aims of those endeavours are ultimately these values (unless I’ve decided that there are other values that Objectivists as such are best suited to pursue). Importantly, I hope to remove any subconscious notion from myself that Objectivist proselytisation on anything more than an individual basis is really that valuable, since ultimately I think there are values far more fundamental than the Objectivist philosophy as such.

As always, I’d love to hear your thoughts. I’m particularly interested in what people think about my misgivings about the term “Objectivist” and ideas about alternative words for my conceptualization of the relevant group of people.

My Treatment in Last Tuesday’s OAC Call

Last Tuesday (2/11/2010), Dr. Onkar Ghate, Debi Ghate, and Dr. Yaron Brook held a phone conference with most of the current OAC students. In preparation for this call, an email was sent out to the OAC students which, among other things, contained a PDF that had the conclusion of the ARI section of my recent post about Dr. McCaskey’s resignation, and none of the rest. In addition to many other topics, part of the phone conference consisted of Dr. Ghate discussing me and the post, based solely on that conclusion.

Only my conclusion was sent to the group, and only the conclusion was discussed. My post was long for a reason: I knew my conclusions were surprising and I wanted to make sure my evidence was presented as fully as possible. The conclusion was clearly not meant to stand alone. What possible reason was there to take my discussion out of context? I was never told that my post was being used, and if things had happened the way Dr. Ghate intended I wouldn’t have even known that there was an OAC call, let alone that I was discussed. Why was it so important that I not know about this?

My post was characterized as a “rant”. Granted, my post was long, but, however much one may disagree with the conclusions, that is a completely unwarranted description. I strove to make the reasons for my conclusions clear and based on the evidence in a calm, straightforward manner, and though my conclusions may be extreme that does not mean they are the emotionalistic, unsupported spewing that “rant” implies.

According to the discussion, my conclusion is an attack on the integrity and independence of current ARI intellectuals, and Dr. Ghate was surprised by that attack. I think it’s clear (especially given the rest of the article) that I was talking about the implications of the implicit policy of Dr. Peikoff’s email staying in place for the future of the Institute, not anything to do with any current intellectuals. My point (which I stand by) was that IF it’s true that a person can lose his job for an intellectually honest disagreement that does not imply disagreement with Objectivism or contradict the policies of the ARI (as appears to be the case here), THEN the climate at the ARI will be incompatible with the needs of an academic, and one implication of that is that any future work from the ARI will have to be looked over a bit more skeptically. Now, I’m not ruling out the possibility that someone could honestly interpret my statement otherwise, but no one at the ARI, including Dr. Ghate, ever contacted me to make sure my views were understood correctly, or to make sure I was aware of the implications. Why, if Dr. Ghate was so surprised, didn’t he say anything to me? [ADDENDUM 7/11/10 2335 EST: After Anon2 in the comments contacted me privately with his concerns, I want to clarify that it is possible to interpret Dr. Ghate as having said that it was possible I was unaware of the implications of my position. However, although that would mean he wasn't as unfair as I thought he was, it would just make it even more confusing that he didn't try to contact me first.]

I was apparently ridiculed for saying that my interpretation was “the only reasonable interpretation of these events”. That statement was meant to be read in the context of the rest of the post, that is “given what I’ve said here, this is the interpretation I’m lead to”. Obviously, if I was wrong about something in the body of the post, my conclusion is no longer supported as I thought it was, but I don’t see how it’s fair to interpret me as saying that any reasonable man looking at the situation would come to my conclusion. If I had thought that were the case, why would I have put so much time into giving my reasons?

It was claimed that I wrote this post without any attempt at communication or asking questions. This is absolutely false. On September 20th, nearly a month before the publication of my post, I sent an email to Dr. Brook raising the very same concerns I raised in the post. I then postponed writing my post to wait for a reply, which I only gave up on after Dr. Brook’s email published in the NoodleFood post about this issue made it clear that the ARI was not interested in (or able to) clarify the situation. There are at least four people who had intended to contact the ARI with questions who decided not to after I told them my email went unanswered.

The timing and reasoning of my departure from the OAC were also discussed on the call (with my friends and former classmates in the audience!), as was Dr. Ghate’s interpretation of my attitude toward him and the OAC as a whole. Now, I don’t particularly mind them knowing all of that, but that information is mine to tell. If Dr. Ghate thought it was important that the students know these private facts, why didn’t he contact me first to make sure I was ok with them being discussed?

Finally, Dr. Ghate made assumptions about why I am no longer recommending the OAC that I can characterize as nothing less than a completely baseless fantasy. It was suggested (apparently in a very condescending tone) that I planned to tell stories that took class discussions out of context to demonstrate the lack of intellectual independence of OAC students. My post was explicitly set up to be supported only by publicly available facts, and I have given no indication that I thought the classes had evidence of intellectual cowardice (in fact, my experiences demonstrate otherwise), that I would take classroom discussion (that I promised, when joining the OAC, not to spread) out of context, or that anything in this entire post was based on my personal experience in the OAC at all. Why didn’t Dr. Ghate take me at my word: that I was no longer recommending the OAC because I didn’t think the ARI has an appropriate environment for an intellectual so long as Dr. Peikoff’s email goes unchallenged? Perhaps he disagrees with that conclusion, but at least that is what I actually said.

As you can probably guess, I’m extremely upset and furious. I’ve been misrepresented, been subjected to falsehoods, and never received even the courtesy of an email letting me know that anyone took issue with my statement (let alone checking to make sure I was interpreted properly). I sent an email to Dr. Ghate, Dr. Brook, Debi Ghate, and (based on mistaken information about her relationship to the call) Dr. Tara Smith asking for an explanation of this treatment of me, and received nothing. This aspect of the situation has been terrible on many levels: that I’ve been attacked in front of my friends and former classmates, that, if Dr. Ghate had had his way, I wouldn’t have had a chance to defend/explain myself or (if I had thought I had done wrong) apologize, that a man I respected and liked treated me and my intellectual work in such an inappropriate (and, frankly, mean) fashion, and that an educator abused his authority and position to attack his former student in order to provide a “lesson” to his current ones. In order to explain my situation and feelings, to defend myself to my classmates who heard the attack, and to allow the general public to know what Dr. Ghate (sanctioned, by silent assent, by Debi Ghate and Dr. Brook) has done and to judge him accordingly, I had to publish this post. I hope this will help lead to a more just resolution of the situation, but at the very least I will have said my piece.

If you want more information about this situation or my views, please feel free to contact me.

ADDENDUM (7/11/10, 2040 EST):

I have received several comments from those concerned with the source of my information. To that, I have two comments:

  1. I am certain that I am not leaving out important context, and that the remarks I claim were made were made. If you want to know the details of how, please contact me privately.
  2. Perhaps it can be claimed that I should never have been given the information I was given. But I was, and once I knew that I was slandered in front of 70+ OAC students I could hardly stay silent, especially not for a privacy policy that is not binding on me. And even if you disagree with me knowing what I know, I think people should focus on the facts of what was said, included whether it was fair or not, and not on the means by which I learned them.

A Hopefully Helpful Analogy

I’ve had a few people contact me privately questioning my (somewhat tentative, though admittedly strongly presented) negative moral evaluation of the ARI and Dr. McCaskey’s roles in the resignation itself, so I’ve come up with an analogy that I hope gets to the essentials of my concerns:

Suppose you’re a young adult who is mature enough to make his own decisions and have his own values, but you’re still largely financially dependent upon your parents. Sure, you have a job that brings in some money, but they still pick up significant portions of your rent, give you a food and grocery allowance every month, are paying your tuition, legally own your car and much of your property, etc. The extent of your dependence is such that if they chose to withdraw everything that was theirs, you’d have to start a lot of things over: leave your apartment for a much smaller one in a worse neighbourhood, temporarily drop out of school or take on burdensome loans, take on multiple part-time jobs in addition to your full-time position, etc. One day your parents present you with an irrational or unjust ultimatum (the details of which are left purposefully vague at this point in the hypothetical) that if you don’t do what they want you to, they will withdraw everything. Maybe your first response is “I wish I had taken steps to make myself less dependent upon them!”, but it’s too late. The question, then: when, if ever, are you justified in giving in to their demands?

Are you justified if:

  • You are only giving in in the hopes that the rest of your family finds out and ridicules your parents so much that they decide to give up and stop being interested in your affairs?
  • They are asking something minor of you, like painting your walls red or taking a bite of fish at the dinner table even though you know you hate it, but don’t have any good reason to ask those things of you?
  • They are asking something significant of you, but that applies to only your secondary values, like asking you to move to a different part of town or to spend every holiday with them?
  • They are asking something significant of you that applies to your primary values, but not to your central purpose, like asking you to break up with your girlfriend or to stop ordering lectures from the Ayn Rand Bookstore?
  • They are asking you to give up something central to you, like changing your career or removing a part of your body?
  • They are asking you to commit an injustice against another person, such as circumcising your child or unfairly slandering a person’s name in public?

For the sake of the hypothetical, assume that there is no evidence that this is a one-time demand from your parents, nor that you will be independent of them (either through death or your own actions or through them choosing to formally promise their financial support free of conditions) in time for you to reverse the particular action they are demanding.

I’d greatly appreciate any feedback here. I think, depending on your perspective, it’s possible to interpret the situation the ARI (and Dr. McCaskey, who had to act in its interests) was in as being like any of the above hypothetical positions. I personally think that any but the first two cases would ultimately be a self-defeating pragmatic sanction, and am not even sure that the second case wouldn’t be, but I’m open to arguments on this issue.

Thoughts on Dr. John McCaskey’s Resignation and the Events Surrounding It

Introduction and Background

On September 3rd of this year, Dr. John McCaskey (hereafter referred to as JMcC) posted a public announcement of his resignation from the Ayn Rand Institute and the Anthem Foundation for Objectivist Scholarship (hereafter jointly referred to as the ARI), and he has since made several important updates, including posting several relevant emails. He also linked to an Amazon book review. On October 12th, the Drs. Hsieh posted a detailed review (for which I am extremely grateful) of the pertinent facts about the resignation and the events leading up to and following it. Except where necessary, I will not be rehashing this background and will assume from here on out that my audience has studied these sources. My purpose here is to finally make public my evaluations of the major players involved in the situation (Mr. David Harriman, hereafter referred to as DH, Dr. Leonard Peikoff, hereafter referred to as LP, JMcC, and the ARI) and my planned course of action.

I view this as an important issue for all of the reasons given by the Drs. Hsieh. In particular, I care about this issue because of three important aspects: 1. Particularly since I am a scientist, understanding the philosophical theory in question, determining its validity, and seeing it gain acceptance are hugely relevant. 2. A man has lost his job and stature and has been accused of moral transgressions, and justice in that matter is important whether he is guilty or innocent . 3. The ARI, to which I have donated and on which many Objectivists (at least partially) rely to help change the culture, has established an important precedent about involvement at its highest levels, and that precedent (whether right or wrong) has the potential to have significant effects on the future of the organization so long as it is unchallenged. I want to make it clear, though, that I do NOT care about this issue in order to gleefully attack great men or organizations, nor to praise small men without warrant. I do not take any pleasure in falsely denouncing, nor in granting undeserved sanction. My interests here are in discovering the truth and acting justly in accordance with that truth. Therefore, if you disagree with anything I write here (which I expect most of my readers will at one point or another), I ask of you to act as if I’m honestly mistaken and to please correct me with any facts or arguments that I may not have considered. If I am wrong, I will be thankful for the opportunity to change my mind to be right.

Evaluation of Dr. Leonard Peikoff

Overview:

In my view, there are five interrelated aspects relevant to judging LP’s actions in this matter:

  • His ultimatum
  • The reasons given for the ultimatum
  • The tone of his email
  • The fact that he granted permission for his email to be published as part of JMcC’s resignation statement
  • The fact that he has made no public comment on this issue, nor has he responded to emails from Dr. Diana Hsieh, with whom he has corresponded in the past.

The ultimatum:

First, I think it is straightforward that LP was well within his legal rights to present the ultimatum he did. Unless he has some sort of contract (for which there is no evidence), he is allowed to set whatever terms he wants for his continued association with the ARI. The question, then, is: was LP acting morally in presenting the ultimatum? In other words, was there good reason, within his context, for LP to withdraw his support from the ARI if JMcC continued his board membership? To answer this, let’s turn to LP’s own words: “When a great book sponsored by the Institute and championed by me… is denounced by a member of the Board of the Institute, which I founded, someone has to go, and someone will go.” What does “denunciation” consist of?

Do JMcC’s criticisms involve an explicit rejection of any of the principles of Ayn Rand’s philosophy? There is no evidence of this, JMcC’s claims and examples contradict the possibility, and no such explicit rejection has been pointed out by either LP or DH, as it surely would be if there were such a statement. Do JMcC’s criticisms demonstrate that JMcC either does not understand or does not fully accept Objectivism? Well, according to LP, JMcC attacks LL and thus, implicitly or explicitly attacks LP’s introduction to LL, which states that LL expresses Ayn Rand’s epistemology. But a disagreement about as complex an issue as whether or not a particular theory of induction is an expression of Objectivist epistemology (which by itself does NOT include any theory of induction) does not ipso facto imply that either party does not understand/reject Objectivism. LP himself explains in one of his podcasts that there is room for legitimate disagreement in the realm of application of principles, which is even more true in the realm of determining if new abstract work is consistent with an entire body of existing knowledge. Moreover, it is not inconsistent for JMcC to say “LP understands Objectivism as a whole better than I, but I think he is wrong about this particular question.” So does something particular in JMcC’s disagreement imply misunderstanding/rejection of Objectivism? Here, LP is unspecific and merely states that the disagreements “often go to the heart of the philosophical principles at issue.” JMcC’s published criticisms, sample emails, and own claims seem to suggest that most of his criticism was about the accuracy of certain historical facts, with some more theoretical issues (such as questions about how applicable Rand’s spiral theory is to the issue of induction) being put forth, thought with less certainty than the historical questions. Overall, though, there is nothing that he has said that obviously implies a misunderstanding of Objectivism, and no one, including LP, has been able to point to a specific argument which shows lack of understanding. Given JMcC’s previous scholarly work and work with the ARI, I have to reject any general “there must be SOMETHING that shows he rejects Objectivism” claim as arbitrary at this point.

Perhaps, then, JMcC’s criticisms are still inappropriate even though they don’t imply a misunderstanding of Objectivism? Does the fact that the ARI has supported this book imply some sort of impropriety in JMcC’s actions? Well, before his resignation none of his comments were made publicly and all seem to have been made with the aim of improving LL, so JMcC was certainly not acting contrary to the promotion of the book. In fact, I believe the right kind of robust, public discussion and debate of the complex new philosophical issues in LL brings more attention to the book, brings more attention to Objectivism as a system of thought off of which future work can build, and can help all involved refine, improve, and better defend their ideas, thus supporting the ARI’s specific goal of promoting LL and its general goal of promoting Objectivism as a legitimate, serious school of thought. All of JMcC’s published criticisms have a respectful tone and are focused on understanding the facts and how they shape the theory, which is exactly the kind of criticism that should be welcomed by the creator of any intellectual work.

Therefore, unless someone can point to any evidence that LP had reason to know for certain that JMcC does not understand Objectivism, that he was disrespectful to LP or DH’s intellectual stature, or that he was not legitimately focused on the facts of reality and improving the intellectual output of the ARI in his criticisms, I must conclude that LP was not acting morally when presenting his ultimatum. I say “know for certain” because only certainty could justify the fact that LP presented his ultimatum after saying that he did not want to discuss what he took as facts and without consulting directly with JMcC even once.

The reasons given:

Was the way LP gave his reasons for the ultimatum proper? Without knowing what previous discussion occurred between LP and the ARI board/Arline Mann, it is impossible to judge this in the original context of the email. However, by explicitly granting permission for JMcC to publish the email publicly as-is and by not saying anything further on the matter, LP allowed the email to become part of a new context in which it must stand on its own. The email does not explain what JMcC did to constitute an attack, does not explain in what ways JMcC’s criticisms go to the heart of the philosophical principles at issue, does not explain how JMcC’s behaviour amounts to saying that LP or DH are misguided and that JMcC knows Objectivism better than either, does not explain how JMcC’s criticisms constitute an attack, and does not explain why such denouncement implies that someone must go. LP is certainly not required to explain his actions to the public, but he did choose to explain them and by failing to back up his claims he seems to be either expecting us to take him on his authority or saying that the issue is so obvious that reasons need not be stated explicitly. Either way, the presentation is insulting and unfair.

The tone:

Regardless of how just his ultimatum may be, I don’t think anything can justify reminding the co-chair of the ARI who LP is or what his intellectual status is in Objectivism, especially not in as condescending a manner as was done in LP’s email. Similarly, I don’t think there is any evidence whatsoever that JMcC has committed a transgression justifying discussion of “rungs of hell”, and while that may be merely a figure of speech in a private email to someone with whom LP may or may not have previous context, by allowing the email to go public that phrase cannot but be taken as an extreme moral denunciation, which I think is quite unjust.

Allowing the email to go public:

It seems evident that this email was part of a larger context, including but not necessarily limited to the prior phone exchange with Arline Mann and knowledge about the nature of LP’s relationship with the ARI board (which relationship, as the Drs. Hsieh point out, is not a matter of public knowledge). Given that, why did LP not only give permission for the email to be posted publicly, but give said permission knowing that the person who would be posting the email was someone who he had denounced as unfit for service on the ARI board? When JMcC demanded a statement as a condition of his resignation, why didn’t LP either provide the full context for his claims or prepare a statement more appropriate for a public audience? As it is, the email seems at best inappropriate and at worst completely dismissive of the public audience. If LP didn’t find it important enough to prepare a public statement, he should have refused permission rather than allow the email as it is to become his public statement.

The lack of other public statement:

I actually don’t have a problem with this on its own, as I don’t think the public has any claim on him to explain his actions. However, given that he allowed the email to go public I do think that if he cares about how rational people may interpret this situation he should post some sort of explanation. Finally, while I don’t have enough information to form any sort of solid conclusion about this, I do find it odd at the least that he hasn’t responded to Dr. Diana Hsieh, who throughout this whole mess has been extremely respectful and interested only in discovering what actually happened.

Conclusion:

So it’s probably pretty clear that my judgment of LP’s behaviour in this issue is quite negative. What do I intend to do about it? Nothing. I have no claim on LP, and he has no claim on me. I already own most of his major lectures on tape or CD, and I don’t think that there’s anything that could happen that would result in me not buying his forthcoming book on the DIM hypothesis aside from him not finishing it. Sadly, all I get from this aspect of the issue is a sense of disappointment in a hero.

Evaluation of Mr. David Harriman

Overview:

I see four relevant issues in judging DH:

  • The extent to which LL reflects the discussions DH had with JMcC in the years leading up to its publication
  • DH’s denial of permission to release his emails with JMcC
  • DH’s characterization of JMcC’s views and his implications about JMcC’s character/intentions
  • DH’s question about “believability”

LL’s reflection of discussions between DH and JMcC:

Since we don’t have the totality of the interaction between DH and JMcC, we can only judge this based on the three email samples that JMcC provided. This section will draw specific examples from LL, and will be as generous to DH’s interpretation of the history as possible (that is, while he may or may not agree with the accepted view of the history, I will assume that DH is right about how things actually happened in these experiments in spite of such disagreement unless evidence to the contrary is too strong). However, even if DH is exactly right about every aspect of history he puts forth, if some of his important historical interpretations are justifiably controversial (that is, there is legitimate reason for an honest student of the history in question to disagree with the interpretation), I think it was incumbent upon him to at least mention the controversy. This (the need to address justifiable controversy in intellectual work) is an important and general issue that I hope to make the focus of a future post.

In the first email, JMcC raises the question of whether Galileo really lacked a concept of “gravity” as an interaction between the earth and an object, referring to the writings of various scientists and philosophers of science from Galileo’s day and one excerpt from Galileo himself that together seem to strongly suggest that Galileo had at least considered the idea that “the acceleration of natural motion” is caused by “attraction to the center”. In the published form, however, LL still contains the assertion that Galileo “lacked the idea of an unseen interaction between the object and Earth” and that therefore Galileo did not decide to test the effect of geographical location on pendulum period. I think DH could have obtained more precision without losing essentialization by saying that Galileo “did not accept the idea of an unseen interaction between the object and Earth” or, if he did not accept JMcC’s evidence that Galileo had considered the idea at all, the book could have benefitted from an inclusion of a foot/endnote to that effect, since a reasonable reading of the evidence (which may still be wrong, but is not unreasonable to believe) contradicts DH’s view. That being said, this is a minor difference which, in the interpretation most generous to DH (i.e. that Galileo considered the idea but rejected it before he had a chance to see if it integrated with the pendulum), has almost no bearing on DH’s conclusions in this section, so this isn’t a huge deal.

The second email questions DH’s claim that Galileo did not do any experiments involving dropping balls through water, largely based on Galileo’s own writings on the subject. While this disagreement could be quite significant to the argument DH makes, I think (again, being as generous as possible) that DH addresses the concern adequately later in the section starting “Regrettably, Galileo’s published works do not give an entirely accurate portrayal of his discovery process.” on page 57. That paragraph implies that DH discounts any potentially contradictory history that derives from Galileo’s own notes, which is enough for the level of detail taken in the book. An extended argument longer than this paragraph for why DH rejects Galileo’s own story would be out of place here.

The third email concerns the genesis of the vector interpretations of velocity and acceleration, Newton’s use of them in deriving the v-squared-over-r law of circular motion, and Newton’s conception of inertia as a kind of force. Whether or not Newton was the first to conceptualize velocity as a vector quantity is not terribly relevant to the thesis (and DH makes no claim on this either way), but it is quite important to DH’s point that the proper sense of velocity was essential to the formation of the v-squared-over-r law, so if there is any credibility to JMcC’s claim that Newton initially arrived at the law on the basis of the “quantity of motion” conception of velocity (even if that claim is false), DH should have taken some space to say, at the very least, that he does not accept that interpretation of the history (though I don’t know the history enough to know if JMcC’s claim is credible at all). More significant, though, is JMcC’s claim (backed up by the use of “vis insita”) that, at least at the time that the Principia was written, Newton considered inertia a type of force. It is central to DH’s claims about proper and improper concepts as green and red lights to induction that Newton’s work was only possible after a proper conceptualization of inertia and force as quite distinct existents, so even if DH is correct that JMcC “is confused about this issue,” he would have done very well to have said something about this huge discrepancy. Newton’s magnum opus views inertia and forces like gravity as two species of the same genus, at the very least linguistically, so it is certainly incumbent upon anyone claiming that he had separated inertia and force to at least mention this seeming contradiction. That DH failed to do so after having had his attention drawn to the matter by JMcC is strong evidence of some historical sloppiness, at best.

So overall, with one significant exception, I don’t think there’s enough evidence to say if DH was derelict in any intellectual duty in modifying his book based on the criticism we can be sure he saw from JMcC before the final publication date. Moreover, I don’t know the field well enough to be able to say if there are any reasonable controversies that DH should have known about simply through due diligence that he did not respond to. However, that one significant exception combined with DH’s characterization of JMcC’s views and his question about “believability” (both discussed further later) give me cause to be concerned that DH may have missed/left out something important in his presentation.

DH’s denial of permission to release his emails:

DH denied Dr. Paul Hsieh’s request to publish the email exchanges between DH and JMcC. He certainly had no moral obligation to explain why (he has done nothing that gives the public a claim on his private correspondence), but he chose to do so, saying that he doesn’t “think you need access to private emails in order to reach a judgment on this conflict.” This tells me that, at least for DH, JMcC has not done anything relevant to this issue beyond what is available publicly (that is, there is no hidden “smoking gun” that JMcC hasn’t wanted to make public) and that DH thinks that the public critiques clearly demonstrate JMcC’s lack of fitness for service on the ARI board.

The lack of a smoking gun is not relevant to judging DH, but it does seem to put an end to any claims that JMcC is somehow being dishonest or obfuscatory in his characterization of his criticisms (since otherwise, surely DH would have been glad to release that email). The idea that the public critiques demonstrate JMcC’s lack of fitness to serve on the board is confusing given that DH’s only direct claims about JMcC (as opposed to his implication, which I will get to later) are that he mischaracterizes the history and is, to use DH’s word’s, “confused about the issue”. Does DH think confusion about scientific history makes a person unfit for service on the board of the ARI or does he think there is something more central than the confusion? If the former, then I seriously question DH’s standards and think that applying them consistently could only result in board members who are afraid to express their views for fear of being thought confused. If the latter, the fact that he didn’t take the time in the email to spell out his concerns precisely is at best sloppy and at worst either cowardly (he is afraid to speak the real reason) or condescending (he does not think Dr. Paul Hsieh and his audience deserve to hear or can understand the real reason). Overall, then, under the interpretation most generous to him, I find DH’s explanation of his refusal sloppy and think he would have been better off saying nothing than giving the explanation he did.

DH’s characterization of and implications about JMcC:

DH claims that JMcC thinks that “Galileo discovered the law of free fall without even understanding what is meant by ‘free fall’” and that “Newton discovered his universal laws of motion without understanding the concepts of ‘inertia,’ ‘acceleration,’ and ‘momentum.’” Looking at JMcC’s Amazon review, he does say that initially Galileo grouped together air resistance and buoyancy, but this does not imply that Galileo has no understanding of ‘free fall’, as it can be reasonably assumed that JMcC thinks that Galileo still knew that something was resisting the fall and that that something could be abstracted away. Similarly, while JMcC does say that Newton had not grouped the directionality and magnitude of motion and changes in motion into a unified concept, that does not imply that he did not understand these aspects enough to be able to induce generalizations about them. Under a general interpretation of what it means to understand, then, DH appears to be misrepresenting JMcC’s stance, quite possibly due to an honest misunderstanding. If, however, DH is claiming that any lack of a fully-formed, totally proper concept implies that you don’t understand the relevant facts about it, then he appears to be begging the question: the phrasing “Galileo discovered the law of free fall without understanding what is meant by ‘free fall’” is clearly meant to demonstrate an obvious absurdity, but it is not obvious that a fully-formed, totally proper concept is necessary to make significant progress in gaining inductive understanding an idea. Indeed, to the extent that JMcC addressed theoretical issues in his discussions with DH, that is the crux of JMcC’s questioning of DH’s theory! Moreover, the Amazon critique was intended to merely raise questions about historical facts, not to discuss theoretical issues. It is absolutely backwards to deny a claimed historical fact on the basis that that fact would be absurd according to your theory. Sticking with the most generous interpretation, however, the worst I can say is that DH has an honest misunderstanding of JMcC’s claims here, which is of course no moral failing at all.

DH then goes on to characterize JMcC’s views as “scientists stumble around in the dark and somehow discover laws of nature before they grasp the constituent concepts.” I find this characterization unjust on two counts. First, nowhere does JMcC say anything that can be interpreted as him thinking that scientists stumble around in the dark. Now, perhaps DH thinks his statements can’t help but imply such a conclusion about the scientists (I disagree, but that’s irrelevant to this point), but there is a big difference between believing a certain view and believing things that logically entail that view. Indeed, there is an important form of argumentation (reductio ad absurdum) based upon the idea that a person would reject a certain view if he knew the logical consequences of that view. In fairness, DH should not assume that JMcC sees that his views imply this “stumbling” characterization and that, if he knew about that implication, he might change his mind accordingly. Secondly, the “somehow” in DH’s characterization is unwarranted. JMcC may not have a theory of induction of his own, but he certainly doesn’t think that the scientific process is as unknowable or random as “somehow” implies from an Objectivist. Now, perhaps DH simply meant “JMcC cannot currently explain how scientists manage to discover the laws of nature”, but if so then he should have been more careful given the usual Objectivist connotation of “somehow” in that kind of context as meaning “it just happens, with no cause or reason”.

Finally, DH remarks that “a favorite pastime among academics today is to find ‘feet of clay’ in great men.” I know of no other way to describe this statement except for: passive-agressive psychologizing. Passive-agressive, because while the obvious implication is that JMcC is one such academic, DH chooses not to come straight out and make that accusation and instead leaves his statement in the general form. Psychologizing, because DH is assigning a particularly nasty motive to JMcC without nearly enough evidence to claim that he does, in fact, wish to or enjoy finding flaws in great men, or that such a desire necessarily underlies the kinds of questions JMcC was asking. This statement makes DH look petty and nasty, and he would have been much better off without it.

As a whole, then, I find DH’s public characterization of JMcC’s views and motivations to be inaccurate, unjust, and, in parts, vicious. This makes me seriously question whether DH understands (or, worse, wants to understand) JMcC’s claims, though I can’t say for sure that he doesn’t.

DH’s question about “believability”:

DH sums up his argument against JMcC’s claims by saying “In short, I ask you which is more believable — that Isaac Newton was fundamentally confused about the difference between ‘impetus’ and ‘momentum,’ or that John McCaskey is confused about this issue?” Now, I want to make it clear that I don’t think DH has any obligation to publicly respond to any particular criticism of his work. He is a busy man and has been spending years working on this book, presumably he thinks it presents a good enough argument to stand on its own, and in any case it is ultimately incumbent upon individuals to do their own research and thinking if they want answers on this issue. That being said, DH chose to address the criticisms, and in doing so raised quite a few questions and concerns.

Supposing that JMcC is indeed confused about this issue, why does that warrant the response he has received from DH and LP? If DH thinks JMcC is confused, why doesn’t he try to correct the confusion? Again, why does confusion imply that JMcC is unfit for service on the ARI board? If JMcC is confused, why the accusations about clay feet? If JMcC isn’t just confused, why does DH choose to sum up his response to JMcC by only claiming that he is? It seems clear, from the rest of his response, that DH thinks JMcC is more than just confused, so this seems like another example of possible sloppiness in DH’s email.

More disconcerting, however, is DH’s question about the relative “believability” of the great scientists having confusions on a particular issue versus JMcC having confusions on the issue. In this context, it appears that DH wants us to judge this issue based on the relative characters, intellects, and track records of the scientists in question and JMcC, as he offered this question as the summation of his evidence for rejecting JMcC’s claims. But this is a completely inappropriate way to judge this controversy. Regardless of the greatness of Newton, if there is evidence that he may be confused or mistaken about an idea then the character of the person presenting that evidence is irrelevant. The proper approach is to look at the evidence available and judge the issue at hand accordingly. If there is not enough evidence to judge, then the proper response is to withhold judgment unless more evidence becomes available. It is certainly not necessary to address every criticism put forth by every crackpot about an intellectual giant, but if you choose not to address the criticism you should say that you are not addressing it, not that you have proven it wrong. Additionally, a lack of omniscience (such as an inappropriately grouped concept, or an as-yet unformed one) is NOT a slight on the character of a great man, and pointing it out is not an attack. Raising the possibility that Aristotle or Galileo or Ayn Rand may have made an honest error or may have lacked relevant knowledge is not an absurdity. If such a possibility is to be addressed, it needs to be addressed by looking at the evidence given for it, not by the person raising it in the first place.

DH’s question about “believability” also raises concerns about the content of LL. If he thinks believability is a good test to apply to this question, did he also apply that test in his studies of the scientific history leading to the book? When faced with two different accounts of how a particular scientist acted, did he choose based upon asking which leads to a more believable story about the scientist in question rather than looking at the evidence given for each account? If so, then his entire historical narrative is suspect. As it is, there is not enough evidence to say how widely he thinks the questions of believability apply, but there is still significant concern.

Conclusion:

DH’s actions paint a very concerning picture. At best there are serious concerns about the quality of his scholarship and the calibre of his intellectual debate, and at worst he has based a historically narrative on a fantasy, refused to even listen to a man trying to correct that narrative, and viciously attacked the man for the privilege. While I am not prepared to outright condemn DH, I will certainly be extremely skeptical in my future in-depth study of LL and, unless things change, will be unlikely to purchase other work from him or support his Falling Apple Science Institute (as had been my plan before this situation). I am, however, open to arguments or evidence that DH is in fact an excellent intellectual and will happily change my stance back to extreme support if I am convinced I am wrong.

Evaluation of Dr. John McCaskey

Overview:

I see four important issues relevant to judging JMcC:

  • JMcC’s private criticism prior to his resignation
  • JMcC’s choice to resign
  • JMcC’s choice to go public with the resignation and criticisms
  • The content of JMcC’s public criticisms

I have already given my evaluation of JMcC’s private criticism in the above sections, so I will not focus on that again here.

JMcC’s choice to resign:

According to JMcC’s resignation post, he chose to resign so that the ARI did not have to choose either side of the ultimatum put forth by LP. Taking as a given that, if he thought the ARI would be better off with him resigning, JMcC had a moral (and probably, as the Drs. Hsieh point out, legal) responsibility to do so, the question becomes: would the ARI have been worse off it had had to choose either side of the ultimatum? Given that he thinks the ultimatum was unjust, I can’t see a good reason for JMcC to have thought so. Regardless of the material value brought to the ARI by LP’s association with it, surely the ARI would be better off losing that association than capitulating to an (in JMcC’s eyes) unjust demand and thereby both losing a valuable man and setting a precedent that LP (or other major donors) can get away with quite a bit by virtue of the fact of their contribution. I believe the ARI would be much better off having told LP something along the lines of “we do not see enough reason that JMcC is unfit to serve on the ARI board, nor do we want to lose your support. We welcome further discussion of this issue and hope you will choose to explain your demand further, but if you choose to cut off your association with us you are obviously free to do so.” If the ARI thought that there was reason that JMcC is unfit but had been (in JMcC’s view) irrational in coming to that conclusion, then neither he nor the ARI would benefit by receiving the sanction for that irrationality granted by a resignation. In my view, JMcC should only have resigned if he did not think he was fit to be on the board or if he thought that the ARI and/or LP had good reason to believe (albeit incorrectly) that he was unfit to be on the board. Given the situation as it is, however, I think JMcC made a mistake, one that might have resulted from pragmatism (when made explicit, something like “what’s a little injustice against one person in the face of the intellectual property rights and influence LP brings to the ARI?). This mistake may have been made honestly, but I do have to wonder if there wasn’t an element of cowardice in his choice not to put the decision in the ARI’s hands.

JMcC’s choice to go public:

Once he had resigned I don’t think JMcC had any further obligation (outside of any still-in-effect contracts) to the ARI, especially not to remain quiet about his side of the situation or his criticisms. I think his choice to publish his reasons for resigning and the email from LP was an appropriate one. First of all, he believes an injustice has been committed against him and he should air his grievances both to vent his frustration/anger and in the hope that either the injustice will be repaired or that the public at large can judge the perpetrators accordingly. Secondly, the reasons he was put into a position to resign are, in his view and mine, atypical for an organization like the ARI, so by making these reasons public JMcC gave the public (which includes donors and potential donors) valuable information about the standards the ARI has for board membership and how the ARI reacts to pressure from those with influence. Such information may be essential to determining whether donation to or involvement with the ARI is appropriate for any given individual, and as a presumably benevolent person JMcC has an interest in seeing the public be armed with this important knowledge.

As for the intellectual criticism he posted, I am mixed. I think his book review was absolutely appropriate as Amazon is not a place to expound theories and JMcC merely gave the information and interpretations that he thought could be relevant to the choice to buy the book. That being said, I do wish he would find some appropriate place to post a full review of the book or at least repost all of the criticisms he has made so far in private. As important as the resignation issue is, I think it is more important that the philosophical ideas at hand get discussed and it would be a shame if this issue got in the way of JMcC contributing to the intellectual discourse at hand. However, since he has not made any sign that he is closed off to further comment, I think it is appropriate to give him time to produce such a detailed critique before forming a final judgment about the lack of same.

The Content of JMcC’s Criticisms:

I am not familiar enough with the relevant history to judge the accuracy of JMcC’s historical claims, nor have I investigated the issues enough to come to a final judgment on his philosophical claims. I do, however, think that he has put forth the criticisms in a manner that was both respectful to those he is critiquing and useful (in the sources he cites and the leads he provides) to those wanting to investigate further. Even if no further criticism is forthcoming, I expect to refer to his existing writing quite frequently when I take the time to study LL in depth.

Conclusion:

On the whole, I think JMcC has been gravely wronged (while making a pretty serious mistake along the way) for acting in a way that was not only not appropriate but was actually helpful to the ARI’s individual goal of promoting LL and long-term goal of spreading Objectivism. With the exception of his resignation, I think his behaviour so far has been exemplary and am now just hoping for more. As a result of this, I intend to do two things: I will be much more likely to read his other academic work, and, since he appears to be willing to talk about this issue, I will be sending him an email asking about a more fleshed-out critique and why he thought the resignation was the right choice.

Evaluation of the Ayn Rand Institute and its Representatives

Overview:

I see three issues relevant to judging the ARI:

  • How the ARI responded to LP’s ultimatum
  • The fact that the ARI accepted JMcC’s resignation
  • The ARI’s public comments on this issue

Since the details of their response to LP’s ultimatum are not public and therefore no judgment can be made about them, I will not be addressing that issue here.

Accepting JMcC’s resignation:

This fact is difficult to judge since we don’t know if the ARI had any more reason to remove JMcC from the board beyond what information is available to the public now. If they didn’t, then I think they should have refused to accept JMcC’s resignation and refused to accept LP’s ultimatum, since given the evidence currently available the ultimatum was unjust and sets the dangerous precedent that any disagreement with those with enough influence puts your job at risk. Assuming still that they didn’t have further reason, the fact that they did accept the resignation seems to be the same kind of pragmatic sanction of injustice (whether due to honest mistake or cowardice) that I think JMcC committed in resigning. If, however, they did have more reason, it is impossible to judge their choice without knowing the reason. However, given that the ARI gave permission for JMcC to publish LP’s email, that no one has disputed the JMcC’s characterization of the reasons for the ultimatum or the nature of his criticisms, and that Dr. Yaron Brook did not mention the existence of additional reasons (not even to say that they were private) beyond the intellectual criticisms that JMcC described in his email (intended for publication) to Dr. Diana Hsieh. As such, I am skeptical that there was any further reason to remove JMcC from the board and am therefore almost certain that the ARI should not have accepted JMcC’s resignation.

The ARI’s public comments:

To date, the only public information sanctioned in some way by the ARI is LP’s email and the email from Dr. Yaron Brook to Dr. Diana Hsieh. The situation as can be understood from JMcC’s post and especially LP’s email is that a man lost his job because he disagreed with an influential and resourceful individual in a way that was completely appropriate for intellectual debate and that was intended to help that resourceful individual (or, in particular, the person he supported) in his work and, ultimately, further the discussion of Objectivist ideas. The email from Dr. Brook does not contradict this view of the situation, nor does it give any evidence that there are other factors at play. Through Dr. Brook, the ARI claims to understand why the public has an interest in this affair, but does not seem to view that interest (which plays a role in how the public chooses to interact with and donate to the ARI) to be important enough to respond to. Unlike the other players in this situation, I do think that the ARI, as an organization funded primarily by donation, had a moral (though certainly not legal) obligation to explain what makes this extraordinary situation (which as of right now seems to have profoundly negative implications for the nature of the ARI) ok.

Conclusion:

I am extremely concerned by the way this situation reflects on the ARI. The only reasonable interpretation of these events (which interpretation the ARI has done nothing to contradict) is that honestly-held views that do not explicitly contradict Objectivism, do not imply that the view-holder does not accept/understand Objectivism, and do not contradict with the overall policies of the ARI, when expressed in a way that furthers both abstract and particular goals of the ARI, can lead to the loss of a job if the wrong person disagrees. That state of affairs and the intellectual silence it implies are incompatible with the needs of an intellectual working to create and spread knowledge, and if it is not challenged it can only lead to a stagnant group of yes-men. As such, I am sad to say that I will no longer be donating to the ARI until it either gives some evidence that this interpretation of these events is incorrect or admits that this situation was not handled properly and gives assurances that this kind of thing will not happen again. I will also likely not take all of the general sessions (opting instead for a la carte options) at any future OCON, attend the banquets, or go to the talks on ARI programs or the state of the ARI. I will not seek to have the Objectivist group that I intend to start here in Rochester be affiliated in any official way with the ARI. Wherever I find it appropriate, I will publicly state my decision to stop donating/supporting the organization, and I will try to convince my friends to stop donating as well. As I have quite a few friends who are intellectuals or intend to be intellectuals, I will make it clear to them that taking any position at the ARI is a dangerous idea and that, at the very least, they should not count on such a position in their overall plans. I will no longer recommend the OAC, and I will be somewhat skeptical that future intellectual work coming out of the ARI is truly the result of individual, independent thought. In other words, I will stop supporting them, try to get others to join me, and be loud enough about it that the ARI will have to change its stance.

Minicon Talks!

I just got back from the Atlanta Objectivist Society‘s Mini-Con (which was an awesome time, the subject of a later post), where I gave two talks: one about practical benefits of epistemology and one about regulation in the medical device industry. I recorded both and am posting them here, but I have two disclaimers first: 1. These were informal talks and I make no guarantees about any accuracy. Particularly with the medical devices talk, the particulars I discuss may not be perfect reflections of what actually is in the real world and are more reflections of my memory. 2. I have not edited these, nor listened to them all the way through. Some questions in the Q/A sessions may be difficult to hear; if you want me to try and clarify what was asked at that point give me the time in the lecture and I’ll see if I can remember.

Epistemology Talk

Medical Devices Talk

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